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EFFECTUATING COLORADO'S CAPITAL SENTENCING
SCHEME IN THE AURORA THEATER SHOOTING TRIAL
JUDGE CARLOS A. SAMOUR, JR.'
ABSTRACT
This Article discusses how the court effectuated Colorado's four-
step capital sentencing scheme in the sentencing hearing held in the case
of the People of the State of Colorado v. James Eagan Holmes in July
and August 2015. Although the Colorado Supreme Court has analyzed
on multiple occasions the sequential decisions required by this State's
death penalty statute, it has never had occasion to address the structure of
a sentencing hearing or, more specifically, whether the questions that
must be answered should be presented to the jury one at a time in a fur-
cated proceeding that follows a logical sequence or all at once at the end
of a continuous proceeding that is uninterrupted by intermediate delib-
erations. In the Holmes trial, the court found that trifurcating the sentenc-
ing hearing was the most prudent course of action under the circum-
stances involved, especially considering the defendant's insanity plea.
The court combined the two middle steps of the capital sentencing
scheme into one step, for a total of three steps, and divided the sentenc-
ing hearing into three separate phases, one dedicated to each step. The
jury was required to deliberate at the end of each phase, and it was only
allowed to continue to the next phase if it made certain findings. Of
course, this is by no means the only method of applying the State's capi-
tal sentencing scheme-as the old adage goes, "there is more than one
way to skin a cat." However, I remain convinced that it was the most
appropriate approach in the Holmes case, as it significantly minimized
the risk of confusing the jury, guided counsel in the presentation of evi-
dence and arguments, and allowed the court to maintain optimal control
over the proceedings.
t The Honorable Carlos A. Samour, Jr. is the Chief Judge of the Eighteenth Judicial District
in Colorado. He presided over the trial in the case of the People of the State of Colorado v. James
Eagan Holmes, 12CR1522, between January 20 and August 7 of 2015. Judge Samour graduated
from the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Order of St. Ives, in 1990. He clerked for the
Honorable Robert McWilliams on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit from
1990 to 1991. In 1991, he joined the firm of Holland & Hart as an associate. In 1996, he became a
prosecutor in the Denver District Attorney's Office. Judge Samour was appointed to the district
court bench in the Eighteenth Judicial District by Governor Bill Owens in late 2006, and he took the
bench on January 2,2007. In 2014, he was appointed Chief Judge of the Eighteenth Judicial District
by the Honorable Nancy E. Rice, Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.
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I. BACKGROUND
During the early morning hours of July 20, 2012, the community of
Aurora, in Arapahoe County, Colorado, experienced one of the deadliest
mass shootings in this nation's history.' In what is considered the shoot-
ing incident with the largest number of casualties ever in the United
2States, James Eagan Holmes was accused of killing twelve people and
injuring seventy others inside auditoriums eight and nine of the Century
16 Theatres during the midnight premiere of the Batman movie The Dark
Knight Rises. Holmes was charged with two counts of Murder in the
First Degree for each of the twelve deceased victims and two counts of
Attempt to Commit Murder in the First Degree for each of the seventy
injured victims who survived.4 Holmes was also charged with one count
of Possession or Control of an Explosive or Incendiary Device based on
evidence recovered from his apartment, which police officers concluded
had been booby-trapped. Thus, Holmes faced a total of one hundred and
sixty-five substantive counts.
1. CNN Library, 30 Deadliest Mass Shootings in U.S. History Fast Facts, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/us/20-deadliest-mass-shootings-in-u-s-history-fast-facts/ (last
updated Feb. 5, 2016, 12:11 PM); Editorial, Deadliest U.S. Mass Shootings: 1984-2015, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 2, 2015, 12:39 PM), http://timelines.latimes.com/deadliest-shooting-rampages/; Elizabeth
Chuck & Helen Kwong, Tragic List: The Deadliest Mass Shootings in U.S. History, NBC NEWS
(Oct. 1, 2015, 7:58 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/deadliest-mass-shootings-u-s-
history-n437086.
2. See Jeff Glor, Colorado Massacre Could Have Been Worse: Reports, CBS NEWS (July 23,
2012, 10:11 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/colorado-massacre-could-have-been-worse-
reports/
3. Order: (1) Regarding Defendant's Motion to Revise List of Attorneys and Staff Attached
to Juror Questionnaire; and (2) Attaching Final Juror Questionnaire, Final Judge's Introductory
Remarks, and Final Videotaped Remarks Before Individual Voir Dire (Including Chart) (D-269)
Attachment 2 at 3, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Jan. 9, 2015) [hereinafter
Order D-269].
4. Jury Instructions at Nos. 2, 11, 13, 15, 17, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe
Dist. Ct. July 14, 2015).
5. See Jury Instructions, No. 19, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July
14, 2015); Order Regarding Motion to Suppress Mr. Holmes' July 20, 2012 Statement to Special
Agent Gumbinner and Detective Appel (D-127) at 22-24, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arap-
ahoe Dist. Ct. Jan. 9, 2014).
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On April 1, 2013, the District Attorney's Office for the Eighteenth
Judicial District announced that it intended to seek the death penalty
against Holmes.6 A couple of months later, on June 4, Holmes entered a
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to all 165 substantive charges.
Following two extensive court-ordered sanity examinations of the
defendant, as well as related protracted litigation, the case proceeded to
trial on January 20, 2015. The jury was selected on April 14, and counsel
made their opening statements on April 27. A little less than three
months later, on July 16, the jury found the defendant guilty of all the
charges, although the guilty verdicts on six counts of Attempt to Commit
Murder in the First Degree involving three victims in auditorium eight,
an auditorium the defendant never accessed, were for the lesser included
offense of Attempt to Commit Murder in the Second Degree.8 The capi-
tal sentencing hearing on the murder counts commenced on July 22 and
ended on August 7. Because the jury could not unanimously decide
whether the appropriate sentence on each murder count was a life sen-
tence without the possibility of parole or a death sentence, the court was
required to impose a life sentence without he possibility of parole on
each such count.9
Not surprisingly, the selection of the jury was a formidable task and
took almost as long as the guilt portion of the trial and the capital sen-
tencing hearing combined. For multiple reasons, the court felt compelled
to summon nine thousand prospective jurors, reportedly the largest jury
pool ever assembled in the United States.'o First, the case received in-
tense and pervasive pretrial publicity, including local, national, and in-
6. Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty People's Motion P-38, People v. Holmes, No.
12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Motion P-38].
7. Advisement Regarding Plea of Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity at 1, People v. Holmes,
No. 12CRI 522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 4, 2013).
8. Verdict Forms, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 22, 2015).
9. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(d) (2016) ("If the jury's verdict is not unanimous, the
jury shall be discharged, and the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment."); see also
Judgment of Conviction, Sentence, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Aug. 27,
2015); Final Sentencing Verdict Forms, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Aug.
11, 2015) (referencing the Final Sentencing Verdict Forms for all twenty-four counts sought against
James Holmes).
10. See Order Amending Juror Questionnaire, Increasing the Number of Prospective Jurors,
and Providing Additional Information About Jury Selection (C-159) at 1, People v. Holmes, No.
12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Nov. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Order C-159] (increasing the number of
jury summonses from 6,000 to 9,000); Order Regarding Defendant's Request to Continue Trial (D-
245-B) at 2 n.1, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014) [hereinafter
Order D-245-B] (explaining why the court anticipated that selecting a jury would be difficult and
time-consuming); Order Regarding Defendant's Request to Close Jury Selection to the Public (D-
154-a-2) at 1 n.1, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 11, 2014) [hereinafter
Order D-1 54-a-2] (referring to 6,000 citizens being summoned for jury service); Order Regarding
Defendant's Motion for Juror Postponements and Excusals to be Made on the Record (D-80) at 2,
People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 27, 2013) [hereinafter Order D-80]
(initially estimating that 5,000 jury summonses would be necessary); Faith Mangan et al., Largest
Jury Pool in US History Gathered as Colo. Movie Gunman James Holmes' Trial Begins, Fox NEWS
(Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/01/20/jury-selection-to-begin-in-colorado-theater-
shooting-trial/.
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ternational media coverage, and the court realized that almost all of the
prospective jurors would have some information about the case. Second,
the defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity meant that the
court would need to screen prospective jurors who had education in or
experience with mental health issues. Third, the prosecution's decision to
seek the death penalty required the court to look for jurors who, in the
event of a sentencing hearing, could conscientiously follow the law and
fairly and impartially decide whether the appropriate sentence was life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole or death. Fourth, the court
and the parties estimated that the guilt portion of the trial and any possi-
ble sentencing hearing would take four to five months, so the court need-
ed to find jurors who were willing and able to make a significant time
commitment. Fifth, given the ubiquitous media coverage the court and
the parties anticipated during the guilt portion of the trial and any sen-
tencing hearing, as well as the expected length of the proceedings, the
court selected twelve alternate jurors, one for each deliberating juror.
Lastly, the decision to order such an enormous jury pool reflected the
court's awareness of the defense's pending motion for a change of venue,
which asserted that the defendant could not receive a fair trial in Arapa-
hoe County with Arapahoe County jurors.1
As expected, jury selection focused on sentencing. The court uti-
lized an extensive jury selection process to achieve the following objec-
tives: (1) learn about prospective jurors' thoughts, beliefs, biases, and
prejudices related to the potential penalties of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole and death; (2) educate prospective jurors on the
law in Colorado regarding capital sentencing hearings and the two poten-
tial penalties; and (3) screen prospective jurors after such education to
ensure that those selected would apply the law conscientiously and
would be fair and impartial.
Colorado jurisprudence on capital sentencing requires that the jury
make certain sequential determinations before it may consider whether
the appropriate sentence is a life sentence without the possibility of pa-
role or a death sentence.12 Based on its decision at each step of the pro-
cess, the jury may either move on to the next step, or it must return a
sentencing verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of pa-
role. Significantly, the rules governing the admissibility of evidence,
the purpose or purposes for which evidence previously admitted may be
11. See Motion for Change of Venue [D-206] at 1-2, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522
(Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Apr. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Motion D-206]. The court denied the defendant's
motion to transfer the case to another Colorado county after twenty-four jurors (including twelve
alternates) were selected approximately two months ahead of schedule. Order Regarding Defend-
ant's Motion to Supplement Motion for Change of Venue and Reply in Support of Motion for
Change of Venue (D-206a) at 2, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR 1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Apr. 23,
2015).
12. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2).
13. Id.
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considered, the burden of proof (if any), and the degree of certainty that
may be required in the decisions the jury is asked to make vary depend-
ing on the step of the sentencing hearing involved.14 As a result, and giv-
en the complexities inherent in the affirmative defense of not guilty by
reason of insanity, which are exacerbated in a capital sentencing hearing,
the court ruled that the sentencing hearing would be trifurcated.15 Ac-
cordingly, the jury was required to deliberate at each step of the process
before it could move on to the next step, although, as explained later, the
court condensed the four steps outlined by the Colorado Supreme Court
into three steps.
In this Article, I first review the law on capital sentencing. I then
discuss the process followed in the capital sentencing hearing held in
Holmes in an effort to minimize the risk of confusing the jury, to guide
counsel as they presented evidence and arguments, and to allow the court
to maintain optimal control over the proceedings.'7
II. LAW REGARDING CAPITAL SENTENCING
A. The Eighth Amendment and Relevant U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
Before discussing Colorado's capital. sentencing scheme, it is im-
portant to review the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the
U.S. Supreme Court's cases interpreting and applying the Amendment.
This authority is important because it forms the foundation for Colora-
do's capital sentencing scheme.'8
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted."' 9 In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gregg v.
14. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(l}-(2); People v. Dunlap (Dunlap 1), 975 P.2d 723, 735-36 (Colo.
1999).
15. See Order D-269, supra note 3, at Attachment 3, at 4-10; Order Regarding Defendant's
Motion for Defense and Prosecution to Have Same Number of Closing Arguments at Any Sentenc-
ing Trial (D-142) at 4-5, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Mar. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter Order D-142].
16. Order D-269, supra note 3, at Attachment 3, at 4-10; see also Jury Instructions-Phase
Three of Sentencing Hearing, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Aug. 6, 2015)
[hereinafter Phase Three Instructions]; Jury Instructions-Phase Two of Sentencing Hearing, People
v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 30, 2015) [hereinafter Phase Two Instructions];
Jury Instructions-Phase One of Sentencing Hearing, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR 1522 (Arapahoe
Dist. Ct. July 22, 2015) [hereinafter Phase One Instructions]; Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 735-36.
17. See, e.g., Order D-142, supra note 15, at 5.
18. People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 790 (Colo. 1990) ("The [Colorado] death penalty
statute ... was enacted against a background of decisions of the United States Supreme Court ...
considering whether the death penalty statutes of other states violated the eighth amendment's pro-
scription of 'cruel and unusual punishments' as that proscription is made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment." (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIll)).
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
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Georgia2 0 that imposition of the death penalty does not constitute "cruel
and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.2 1
However, the Eighth Amendment requires that the death penalty be
"imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all."22 Conse-
quently, where a sentencing body is given discretion "on a matter so
grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to min-
imize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."2 3 The Court, in
Gregg, concluded that "these concerns are best met by a system that pro-
vides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is
apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and
provided with standards to guide its use of the information."24 For pur-
poses of addressing Eighth Amendment concerns in capital proceedings,
the United States Supreme Court divides the decision-making process
into two stages: the eligibility decision and the selection decision.25
The eligibility stage narrows the class of convicted murderers who
may be sentenced to death.2 6 "[T]here is a required threshold below
which the death penalty cannot be imposed."27 The states have adopted
two methods to narrow the class of defendants who are eligible to receive
a death sentence: (1) a "weighing" method, and (2) a "non-weighing"
method.28 Under both methods, a defendant must be convicted of murder
in the first degree before he may be eligible for a death sentence. 29In
addition, in order for a defendant to be eligible for a death sentence, both
methods require the trier of fact to find at least one aggravating factor, or
its equivalent, during either the guilt or penalty portion of the proceed-
ings.30
From there, the process diverges, depending on whether a state is a
weighing or non-weighing jurisdiction. In weighing jurisdictions, once a
jury has found that at least one aggravating factor exists, it must weigh
the aggravating factor or factors against all mitigating evidence to decide
if the defendant is death-eligible. ' On the other hand, in non-weighing
jurisdictions, a finding of an aggravating factor automatically makes the
32
defendant eligible to receive a death sentence.
20. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
21. Id. at 183-86, 188.
22. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
23. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
24. Id. at 195.
25. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d 723, 735 (Colo. 1999).
26. Id. at 735-36.
27. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305 (1987).
28. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 735.
29. Id. at 736.
30. Id. at 735 (citing Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994)).
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also Woldt v.People, 64 P.3d 256, 263 (Colo. 2003).
582 [Vol. 93:3
2016] COLORADO'S CAPITAL SENTENCING SCHEME
In both weighing and non-weighing jurisdictions, if the jury deter-
mines that the defendant is death-eligible, the process moves to the selec-
tion stage, where the jury decides whether the death-eligible defendant
should, in fact, receive a death sentence.33 During the selection stage, the
jury is called to make "an individualized determination on the basis of
the [defendant's] character . . . and the circumstances of [his] crime."34
Because the jury is required to assess the culpability of the individual
defendant, the selection determination in both weighing and non-
weighing jurisdictions "requires the admission of all relevant evi-
dence."35
In a weighing state, the defendant is sentenced to either death or life
imprisonment "based on all relevant information about the individual
defendant."36 "By contrast, in a non-weighing state, 'aggravating factors
as such have no specific function in the jury's decision whether a de-
fendant who has been found to be eligible for the death penalty should
receive it.' 3 7 Indeed, "[i]n a non-weighing state, no special significance
is given to statutory" aggravating factors or statutory mitigating factors
in the selection stage; rather, the jury considers all the evidence presented
in deciding whether to impose a life sentence or the death penalty.
B. Colorado's Capital Sentencing Scheme
Fourteen years after Gregg, in 1990, the Colorado Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty statute in effect in Colo-
rado at that time.39 The Colorado Supreme Court has since upheld death
sentences.4 0
In 1995, the Colorado General Assembly amended the death penalty
statute by substituting "a three-judge panel in place of the jury" during
the sentencing hearing.4' The legislature did so based on a U.S. Supreme
Court decision, Walton v. Arizona,42 that was later overturned in Ring v.
Arizona.4 3 Based on the decision in Ring, the Colorado Supreme Court
declared the three-judge panel capital sentencing statute unconstitutional
on its face.44 In 2002, the Colorado General Assembly reenacted the pro-
visions of the capital sentencing statute in effect before the 1995 amend-
33. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 735-36.
34. Id. at 736 (quoting Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972).
35. Id.; Woldt, 64 P.3d at 263-64.
36. Woldt, 64 P.3d at 264.
37. Dunlap !, 975 P.2d at 735 (quoting Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229-30 (1992)).
38. Woldt, 64 P.3d at 264 (citing Dunlap I, 975 P.2d at 736).
39. People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 170-72 (Colo. 1990), overruled on other grounds by
People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743 (Colo. 2005).
40. See, e.g., People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448, 483 (Colo. 2000), overruled on other grounds by
People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743 (Colo. 2005); Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 735.
41. Woldt, 64 P.3d at 258.
42. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
43. Woldt, 64 P.3d at 258.
44. Id. at 259.
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ment, again making the jury responsible for both the guilt and penalty
determinations in a capital case.45
Under current Colorado law, in a capital case in which the defend-
ant is found guilty of Murder in the First Degree, the same jury that de-
termined guilt must determine the sentence as soon as practicable by
following the statutory sentencing scheme.4 6 The Colorado Supreme
Court has analyzed the death penalty statute presently in effect in this
State on multiple occasions and has found that Colorado's capital sen-
tencing scheme consists of four steps: finding aggravating factors, find-
ing mitigating factors, weighing the aggravating factors proven against
the mitigating factors that exist, and determining whether a life sentence
without the possibility of parole or a death sentence is the appropriate
47sentence.
During the first step, the jury must determine whether the prosecu-
tion has alleged and proven the existence of at least one of the statutorily
specified aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.4 8 The Colorado
Supreme Court has observed that the use of aggravating factors "is not an
end in itself, but a means of genuinely narrowing the class of death-
eligible persons and thereby channeling the jury's discretion."49 If the
jury unanimously finds that the prosecution has proven beyond a reason-
able doubt at least one of the alleged aggravating factors, the sentencing
hearing moves on to step two.so Otherwise, "the jury shall render a ver-
dict of life imprisonment" without the possibility of parole.5
During the second step, the jury must decide whether any mitigating
factors exist.52 A mitigating factor is a fact or circumstance which does
not constitute justification or excuse for the crime, but which, in fairness
or mercy, the jury considers as extenuating or reducing the degree of the
defendant's moral culpability. Like aggravating factors, mitigating fac-
tors in Colorado are listed in a statute; however, that list is not inclusive,
as it contains a catchall category: "[a]ny other evidence which in the
court's opinion bears on the question of mitigation."54 If the defendant
presents mitigating factors, the prosecution has an opportunity to present
evidence offered to rebut those mitigating factors.55 Each juror must then
individually determine whether one or more mitigating factors exist;
45. See id.
46. COLo. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(a) (2016).
47. People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489,496 (Colo. 2007).
48. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)(I); Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d 723, 736 (Colo. 1999).
49. People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 790 (Colo. 1990) (quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484
U.S. 231, 244 (1988)).
50. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(d), (2)(b)(II).
51. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(b)(1).
52. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)(ll); Dunlap I, 975 P.2d at 736.
53. People v. White, 870 P.2d 424, 454 (Colo. 1994).
54. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(4).
55. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 739.
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however, jurors need not unanimously agree that mitigating factors exist
or that the same mitigating factors exist.56
During the third step, the final step of the eligibility stage, the jury
must assess whether the mitigating factors that exist outweigh any aggra-
vating factor or factors proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt.57 In order to make the required determination, each juror must
first decide what weight to assign to each mitigating factor and then must
individually weigh the mitigating factors that exist and the aggravating
factors proven by the prosecution.5 If the jury unanimously finds, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, that the mitigating factors that exist are not
sufficient to outweigh the proven aggravating factors, the defendant is
eligible for a death sentence and the jury moves on to the fourth and final
step of the process, the selection stage, to determine whether the defend-
ant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole or death.
During the fourth and final step, the jury must decide what sentence
is appropriate: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or
death.60 "[T]he question whether death is the appropriate sentence re-
quires a profoundly moral evaluation of the defendant's character and
crime."61 In order to return a sentence of death, the jury must be unani-
mously convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that death is the appropri-
ate sentence.62
At the fourth step, both parties may introduce evidence that is rele-
vant to the nature of the crime, and the character, background, and histo-
ry of the defendant.6 3 In this step, all relevant, admissible evidence is
generally permissible, and it may be presented by both the prosecution
and the defense.4 Indeed, the admissibility of evidence at step four "is
constrained only by familiar evidentiary principles concerning the rele-
vance of the evidence and the potential for that evidence to inflame the
passion or prejudice of the jury. 6 5 Thus, the prosecution may present
evidence relating to any of the statutory aggravating factors, as well as
evidence of aggravating circumstances, which s ould not be confused
with statutory aggravating factors.66 Additionally, the prosecution may
56. People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 789 (Colo. 1990).
57. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)(II); Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 736.
58. Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 791-92.
59. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)(I1I); Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 736.
60. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 741.
61. Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 791 (quoting Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 261 (1988) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring)).
62. Id. at 796.
63. COLO. REV. STAT. §18-1.3-1201(1)(b); Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 740.
64. Dunlap I, 975 P.2d at 739.
65. Id. at 741.
66. Id. at 739-40. The Colorado Supreme Court has explained that there is a constitutional
distinction between statutory aggravators and other aggravating evidence. Id. at 739. "Statutory
aggravators are those factors the General Assembly has identified as weighing in favor of imposition
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present evidence known as "victim impact evidence," which is evidence
"relating to the personal characteristics of the victim and the impact of
the crimes on the victim's family." 67 On the other hand, the defense may
present more evidence of mitigation.
This stands in stark contrast to steps one through three, where "the
jury may [only] consider the following: (1) evidence related to statutory
aggravating factors; (2) ... mitigating evidence; and (3) prosecution evi-
dence offered to rebut mitigating factors raised by the defendant."68 Oth-
er evidence, including, for example, evidence that purportedly contra-
dicts statutory mitigating factors not raised by the defense, is irrelevant
during those steps.6 9 To hold otherwise would have "the net effect of
introducing evidence relating to aggravating circumstances-not aggra-
vating factors-at the eligibility stage," which, in turn, would risk having
the jury "find a statutory aggravator on the basis of aggravating circum-
stance evidence."70 Aggravating circumstance evidence is not admissible
during the first three steps of a capital sentencing hearing because such
evidence "fails to conform to the strict requirement that eligibility stage
evidence 'minimiz[e] the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion. "71
At any step of the sentencing hearing, a party may generally rely on
evidence previously introduced, either in the guilt portion of the trial or
72in the sentencing hearing. Therefore, during the sentencing hearing, a
party need not reintroduce evidence previously admitted.73
However, during the sentencing hearing, certain evidence previous-
ly admitted may be considered only for a limited purpose or, if previous-
ly admitted for a limited purpose, only for a different limited purpose.
Moreover, consideration of previously admitted evidence is circum-
scribed by the rules governing each phase of the sentencing hearing. For
example, in an insanity case, "evidence acquired . . . for the first time
from a communication derived from the defendant's mental processes
during the course of a court-ordered [sanity] examination . . . is admissi-
ble only" for the limited purpose of considering "the issues raised by the
defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity."74 Such evidence
may be considered only in the second, third, and fourth steps of the sen-
of the death penalty," while "(o]ther aggravating evidence is evidence that is unfavorable to the
defendant, but that does not relate to a statutory aggravator." Id
67. COLO. REV. STAT. §18-1.3-1201(i)(b); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825
(1991).
68. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 739.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983)).
72. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(b).
73. See id.
74. Id. § 16-8-107(1.5)(a).
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tencing hearing, and only for a different limited purpose: to determine
"the existence or absence of any mitigating factor."75
The steps of a capital sentencing hearing may also differ in the bur-
den of proof, if any, and the level of certainty that may be required in the
decisions the jury is called upon to make. Although the prosecution bears
the burden of proof at step one-it must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt at least one of the statutory aggravating factors it has alleged-
neither party has a burden of proof during the remaining three steps.
Nevertheless, in step three, "a capital sentencer, in order to deliver a cer-
tain and reliable sentence, must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that any mitigating factors do not outweigh proven statutory aggravating
factors."7 Similarly, in step four, the jury may not return a sentencing
verdict of death unless each juror is "convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant should be sentenced to death."77 The purpose of
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in steps three and four "is not
to fulfill the traditional function of providing guidance in fact-finding but
is to communicate to the jurors the degree of confidence they must have
in the correctness of their ultimate conclusion before they can return a
verdict of death." 8
At the end of the sentencing hearing, if the jury returns a sentencing
verdict of death, it is binding on the trial court "unless the court deter-
mines, and sets forth in writing the basis and reasons for such determina-
tion, that the verdict of the jury is clearly erroneous as contrary to the
weight of the evidence, in which case the court shall sentence the de-
fendant to life imprisonment."79 If the jury is unable to reach a unani-
mous sentencing verdict as to the appropriate sentence, the trial court
must discharge the jury and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.80
In sum, the first three steps of Colorado's capital sentencing process
resemble a weighing state.8' However, the fourth step, during "which the
jury [must] consider[] all relevant evidence without necessarily giving
special consideration to [the statutory aggravating factors or mitigating
factors], resembles the selection stage of a non-weighing state."82 This
four-step statutory structure satisfies Eighth Amendment requirements
because the first three steps "constitutionally narrow the class of murder-
ers to those who are eligible for imposition of the death penalty, and the
75. Id. § 16-8-107(1.5)(b).
76. People v. White, 870 P.2d 424, 456 (Colo. 1994).
77. Id. (quoting People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 797 (Colo. 1990)).
78. Id. (quoting Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 796).
79. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(c).
80. Id § 18-1.3-1201(2)(d).




fourth step affords the sentencing body unlimited discretion to sentence
the defendant o life imprisonment instead of death."
III. THE CAPITAL SENTENCING HEARING IN PEOPLE V. HOLMES
In a pretrial order in the Holmes case, the court ruled that, in the
event a sentencing hearing was necessary, it would be trifurcated.8 Dur-
ing jury selection, the court informed prospective jurors about this ruling
and provided detailed instructions related to the three phases into which
it intended to divide any capital sentencing hearing.8 5 Consistent with its
trifurcation ruling and its concomitant jury selection instructions, at the
end of the guilt portion of the trial, following the jury's guilty verdicts on
all of the Murder in the First Degree counts, the court broke up the sen-
tencing hearing into three distinct phases: Phase One, which consisted of
step one; Phase Two, which consisted of steps two and three; and
Phase Three, which consisted of step four.86 To avoid confusion, the
court did not discuss with prospective jurors or seated jurors the four
steps outlined in the case law in Colorado. Instead, the court consistently
referred to the three phases of a sentencing hearing.87
The sentencing hearing was divided in this manner for various rea-
sons. First, the court was concerned that, given the particular circum-
stances of the case, requiring the jury to conduct the entire analysis all at
once would make it difficult to follow the process and to comply with all
of the court's instructions.88 Second, by splitting up the sentencing hear-
ing, the court provided guidance to counsel in terms of the evidence that
could be presented, the purpose for which it could be presented, and the
arguments that could be advanced at each juncture of the sentencing
hearing.89 Third, the procedure employed allowed the court to exert bet-
ter control over the sentencing hearing because veryone understood the
rules that applied at each phase.90
83. Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 265 (Colo. 2003).
84. See Order D-142, supra note 15, at 4. Neither party raised an objection to trifurcation of
the sentencing hearing.
85. See Order D-269, supra note 3, at Attachment 3, at 5-8.
86. Order D-142, supra note 15, at 4-5.
87. The court consolidated steps two and three into Phase Two because the jury's determina-
tion in step two will necessarily be reflected in its determination in step three. Stated differently, the
jury's finding as to whether any mitigating factors exist will always be a component of the jury's
determination regarding whether it is unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
mitigating factors do not weigh more heavily in the balance than the proven aggravating factors.
Notably, the death penalty statute states that the jury's sentencing verdict must be based on three
considerations: (1) whether at least one aggravating factor has been proven by the prosecution; (2)
"whether sufficient mitigating factors exist which outweigh any aggravating factor or factors found
to exist;" and (3) based on factors (1) and (2), "whether the defendant should be sentenced to death
or life imprisonment" without the possibility of parole. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)
(2016).
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Phase One included step one exclusively. Because the jury could
consider evidence presented uring the guilt portion of the trial,91 the
prosecution chose not to present any evidence in Phase One. In light of
the prosecution's decision, and considering that the prosecution had the
burden of proof, the defense did not present any evidence in Phase One
either.92 After the court read the Phase One instructions to the jury, the
prosecution made a closing argument. Since the defense elected not to
make a closing argument, the prosecution did not have an opportunity to
make a rebuttal closing argument.93 Immediately thereafter, the court
asked the jury to deliberate and to determine whether the prosecution had
proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the
aggravating factors alleged.94
One of the instructions informed the jury that, in reaching its Phase
One sentencing verdicts, it could consider any evidence presented in the
guilt portion of the trial with one exception: it was not allowed to consid-
er any evidence acquired for the first time from a communication derived
from the defendant's mental processes during the course of a court-
ordered sanity examination.95 The court reminded the jury that such evi-
dence had been admitted during the guilt portion of the trial for the lim-
ited purpose of considering the issues raised by the defendant's plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity.96 The court then explained that the issue
of the defendant's sanity was no longer in dispute, as the jury had reject-
ed the insanity defense and had found the defendant guilty on all the
murder counts.
On each murder count, the jury unanimously found that the prosecu-
tion had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, he following four statutory
aggravating factors alleged: (1) that the defendant intentionally, know-
ingly, or with universal malice manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life generally killed two or more persons during the
commission of the same criminal episode; (2) that the defendant, in the
commission of the offense of Murder in the First Degree, knowingly
created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the twelve
victims of the crimes of Murder in the First Degree; (3) that the defend-
ant committed the offense of Murder in the First Degree in an especially
91. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(b).
92. Since no evidence was presented, neither party was allowed to make an opening state-
ment. However, before the parties' closing arguments, the court did provide some introductory
instructions to the jury. See Phase One Instructions, supra note 16, at 11-13.
93. Pursuant to a pretrial order, the prosecution had the first closing argument and the ability
to make a rebuttal argument in the event the defense elected to make a closing argument. See Order
D-142, supra note 15, at 5. The court reasoned that the prosecution was entitled to make the first
closing argument and a rebuttal closing argument because it had the burden of proof in this phase of
the sentencing hearing. Id.; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(l)(d).
94. See Verdict Forms, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 27, 2015)
[hereinafter Phase One Verdict Forms].




heinous, cruel, or depraved manner; and (4) that the defendant committed
the offense of Murder in the First Degree while lying in wait or from
ambush.97 The only statutory aggravating factor alleged by the prosecu-
tion that the jury found was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt was
that the defendant intentionally killed a child who had not yet attained
twelve years of age.98 Given the sentencing hearing Phase One verdicts,
the sentencing hearing continued to Phase Two on all the murder counts.
During Phase Two, which, as indicated, consisted of steps two and
three, each party gave a brief opening statement followed by the de-
fense's presentation of mitigation evidence.99 The defense relied on evi-
dence, presented during both the guilt portion of the trial and the sentenc-
ing hearing, of the following statutory mitigating factors:
(1) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime;
(2) [That] [t]he defendant's capacity to appreciate [the] wrongfulness
of [his] conduct or to conform [his] conduct to the requirements of
[the] law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to consti-
tute a defense to [the] prosecution [of the crimes];
(3) The emotional state of the defendant at the time [of] the crime[s]
(4) The absence of any significant prior conviction;
(5) The extent of the defendant's cooperation with law enforcement
. . . or agencies; and
(6) [The catchall category relating to] [a]ny other evidence intro-
duced ... bear[ing] on the question of mitigation.00
Additionally, relying on the catchall category in the statute, the defense
submitted an extensive twenty-one page, sixty-two paragraph theory of
mitigation instruction, urging jurors to find additional mitigating factors
in the evidence introduced during the guilt portion of the trial and the
sentencing hearing, as summarized in that instruction.01
The prosecution had an opportunity to present additional evidence
to rebut the mitigating factors presented by the defendant but chose not
to do so. Instead, in its closing argument, the prosecution relied on the
evidence introduced during the guilt portion of the trial to rebut the de-
fense's mitigation. Pursuant to a pretrial order, after the court read the
Phase Two instructions to the jury, the defense made its closing argu-
97. Phase One Verdict Forms, supra note 94.
98. Id.
99. Before the parties' opening statements, the court gave the jury Phase Two introductory
instructions. See Phase Two Instructions, supra note 16, at Nos. 1-3.
100. Id. at No. 3.
101. See id. at No. 4.
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ment, which was followed by the prosecution's closing argument; neither
party was allowed a rebuttal closing argument.102 The court then asked
the jury to deliberate.
Under the court's instructions, during deliberations, the jurors were
required to first individually determine whether one or more mitigating
factors existed (step two). Each juror was then directed to individually
determine what weight to give each mitigating factor and to then weigh
the mitigating factors that existed and the aggravating factors proven by
the prosecution (step three).
One of the instructions informed the jury that, in reaching its Phase
Two sentencing verdicts, it could consider all of the evidence admitted
during the guilt portion of the trial and the sentencing hearing with the
following caveat: evidence acquired for the first time from a communica-
tion derived from the defendant's mental processes during the course of a
court-ordered sanity examination could only be considered for the lim-
ited purpose of determining the existence, or absence, of any mitigating
factors. 103 This was consistent with a contemporaneous limiting instruc-
tion the court provided multiple times during Phase Two of the sentenc-
ing hearing. The court cautioned the jury that such evidence could not be
considered as evidence of aggravation or for any other purpose.'1 Thus,
the jury was instructed that evidence that had been admitted during the
guilt portion of the trial for the limited purpose of considering the issues
raised by the defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, which
the jury was prohibited from considering during its Phase One delibera-
tions, could be considered now but for a different limited purpose.
The Phase Two verdict form for each murder count contained a
YES or NO verdict question: "Does the jury unanimously find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the mitigating factors that exist do not outweigh
the aggravating factors proven by the prosecution in Phase [One] of the
sentencing hearing?"10 5 The jury answered "YES" to this verdict ques-
tion on each of the murder counts.'06
102. Because neither party had a burden of proof in Phase Two or Phase Three, the court ruled
that the defense would make the first closing argument, followed by the prosecution's closing argu-
ment, at the end of Phase Two, while the prosecution would make the first closing argument, fol-
lowed by the defense's closing argument, at the end of Phase Three. See Order D-142, supra note
15, at 5-6. The court also decided that at the end of Phase Three, each side would be allowed one
rebuttal closing argument. Id. at 6.
103. Phase Two Instructions, supra note 16, at No. 16.
104. Id.
105. Phase Two Sentencing Verdict Forms, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist.
Ct. Aug. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Phase Two Verdict Forms].
106. The court informed the jury that if it answered "NO" on a verdict form, the sentencing
hearing would end with respect to that count and the court would be required to sentence the defend-
ant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on that count. See Phase Two Verdict
Forms, supra note 105. Because the jury answered all of the Phase Two verdict questions in the
affirmative, the sentencing hearing proceeded to Phase Three on all of the murder counts. See id.
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Following the jury's determination at the end of Phase Two, which
rendered the defendant eligible to receive a death sentence, the sentenc-
ing hearing moved to Phase Three, the selection stage in Colorado's
capital sentencing scheme. At the beginning of Phase Three, each party
gave a brief opening statement.107 Consistent with certain parameters
established by the court, the prosecution presented a limited amount of
victim impact evidence through thirteen witnesses and some exhibits.
The defense chose not to present additional evidence. After reading the
Phase Three instructions to the jury, each side, starting with the prosecu-
tion, made a closing argument. Because the prosecution elected not to
make a rebuttal closing argument, the defense did not have an opportuni-
ty to make a rebuttal closing argument. Therefore, following the de-
fense's closing argument, the court asked the jury to deliberate one final
time to determine the appropriate punishment for the defendant on each
murder count: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or
death.
The final verdict forms gave the jury three options on each murder
count:
1. We, the jury, are unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the appropriate sentence for the defendant, James Eagan
Holmes, on this count is a DEATH SENTENCE.
II. We, the jury, are not unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the appropriate sentence for the defendant, James Eagan
Holmes, on this count is a death sentence, and we, the jury, unani-
mously agree that the defendant should be sentenced to LIFE
IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE on
this count.
Ill. We, the jury, DO NOT HAVE A UNANIMOUS FINAL
SENTENCING VERDICT on this count, and, we, the jury, under-
stand that, as a result, the Court will impose a sentence of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE on
this count. 108
The jury chose the last option on all the verdict forms, indicating that it
was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on any of the murder counts in
Phase Three of the sentencing hearing. Following the reading of the ver-
dicts, the jury was discharged. Approximately two weeks later, in ac-
cordance with section 18-1.3-1201(2)(d), the court held a three-day final
107. Before the parties' opening statements, the court gave the jury Phase Three introductory
instructions. See Phase Three Instructions, supra note 16.
108. Final Sentencing Verdict Forms, supra note 9.
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sentencing hearing to afford all of the victims an opportunity to be heard.
On August 26, 2015, the court sentenced the defendant on the twenty-
four First Degree Murder counts to twelve consecutive life sentences
without the possibility of parole, one for each deceased victim. The court
then imposed a total of 3,318 years in the Department of Corrections and
five years of mandatory parole on the remaining counts, to be served
consecutive to the twelve life sentences without the possibility of pa-
role.1 09
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no direct authority in Colorado on how this State's four-
part capital sentencing scheme should be given effect during a capital
sentencing hearing. When the court decided that any sentencing hearing
in the Holmes case would be trifurcated, it did so, not because either par-
ty requested it-neither did-but because it concluded that it was the
most prudent course of action under the specific circumstances in-
volved. 10 Of course, when the court made this decision, there was no
way to know, with any degree of certainty, whether its assessment of the
potential perils was well-founded. Nor could the Court predict with any
precision whether trifurcation of the sentencing hearing would allay its
concerns.
Now that the proceedings in Holmes have been completed, I am
convinced that, under the circumstances present in the case, dividing the
sentencing hearing into three separate phases, and requiring the jury to
deliberate at the end of each phase, was the wisest approach. While such
trifurcation created more work for the attorneys, the jury, and the court,
and likely extended the length of the proceedings, it was clearly the most
suitable procedure to minimize the risk of confusing the jury. Had the
sentencing hearing not been trifurcated in the Holmes case, the jury
would have received the myriad sentencing rules and instructions all at
once and would have been left to its own devices to navigate through the
capital sentencing labyrinth as it determined whether the defendant
should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of pa-
role or death.
109. Colorado requires a life sentence without the possibility of parole for any conviction for
Murder in the First Degree. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A) (2016).
110. See Order D-142, supra note 15, at 5.
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